Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Husky Oil Company of Delaware v. State Tax
Commission of Utah : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General; G. Blaine Davis; Assistant Attorney General; Stephen R.
Randle; Attorneys for Respondent.
William A. Marshall; Douglas D. Wilkinson; Ray, Quinney, and Nebeker; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Husky Oil Company v. State Tax Commission of Utah, No. 14466.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1513

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT

UTAH !5UP«flME COURT
-•

•"*

f
V9
u
[>w
.39
uJ(pip
IHH
DOCKET WXJ
LLLZLw ~ 1

KFU
45.9

//

/ti

LA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

BRIGHT K . . ^ , . « **iit
J. Reuben tkm L w School

THE STATE OF UTAH

HUSKY OIL COMPANY OF DELAWARE,
Petitioner and Appellant,

-t

m
Case No. 14466

-vSTATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

WRIT OF REVIEW TO REVIEW AN ORDER OF
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
G. BLAINE DAVIS
Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM A. MARSHALL and
DOUGLAS D. WILKINSON of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

STEPHEN R. RANDLE
Assistant Attorney General
84111
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Petitioner
and Appellant

FSL

84114

attorneys for Respondent

JUN 3 0 Wb
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

•gageNATURE OF THE CASE . ' . . . . . .

1

DISPOSITION BEFORE STATE TAX COMMISSION

1

&SEJCEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS .

.

.

. •

. . .

2

POINT I.
UNDER THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTE, ONLY PERSONS
"NOT RETAILERS OR NOT ENGAGED IN BUSINESS QUALIFY FOR
AN EXEMPTION FROM THE SALES AND USE TAXES

3

POINT II.

•

UTAH CASE LAW HAS NOT EXTENDED THE ISOLATED
AND OCCASIONAL SALES EXEMPTION TO A PURCHASE
SUCH AS WAS MADE BY HUSK5T OIL

7

POINT III.
IT IS MISLEADING TO LOOK TO THE LAW OF OTHER
JURISDICTIONS FOR THE MEANING OF THE UTAH
ISOLATED AND OCCASIONAL SALES EXEMPTION

9

POINT IV.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION REGULATION S-38
IS A VALID INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTORY
ISOLATED AND OCCASIONAL SALES EXEMPTION AND
WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO HUSKY OIL
CONCLUSION

11
14

AUTHORITIES CITED
STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
59-16-3
59-15-2 (e)

3
.

.

59-15-2 (c)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4, 5
4, 5

59-15-20

12

59-15-21

12

Revised Civil Statutes of Texas,
Title 122 A, Article 20.01 (F)

11

REGULATIONS
Sales and Use Tax Regulations S-38

. 12, 13, 14

CASES
Geneva Steel v. State Tax Commission,
116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949)

3, 7

Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission,
110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 (1974)

3

Parker v. Quinn,
23 Utah 322, 64 P. 961 (1901)

6

L. A. Young Sons Construction v. State Tax Commission,
23 Utah 84, 457 P. 2d 973 (1969)

9

Big Three Industries v. Keystone Industries Inc.,
472 S.W. 2d 850, (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)

10

McKnight v. State Land Board,
14 Utah 2d 238, 381 P.2d 726 (1963)

13

Reaveley v. Public Service Commission,
20 Utah 2d 737, 436 P.2d 797 (1968)

13, 14

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

M THE SUPREME COURT OF
iHE STATE OF UTAH

HUSKY OIL COMPANY OF DELAWARE,
Petitioner and Appellant,

;

Case No.

vs.

14466

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Respondent,

]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

!

NATURE OF THE CASE

•This case involves the validity of a use tax deficiency
assessed against Husky Oil Company by the State Tax Coirmission.
•Hie Court is asked to resolve a question about the application of
the isolated and occasional sales exemption to a transaction
whereby a seller regularly engaged in retail sales transfers
personal property of a type not sold in its regular business.

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE STATE TAX COMMISSION

The State Tax Crarcrdssion determined a use tax deficiency
against Husky Oil Cortpany of Delaware in the amount of $30,375.00,
plus interest, for the purchase of a refinery fron Gulf Oil Ltd.
of Canada.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent, State Tax Commission seeks affirmance of the
use tax deficiency against the Petitioner of $30,375,00, plus
interest thereon as provided by law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts and a
Supplemental Stipulation of Facts which the Tax Cannission
considered in making written findings. References are to the
Tax Commission's Findings of Fact.
Husky Oil Company of Delaware, a foreign corporation
doing business in Utah, purchased a reformer from Gulf Oil Ltd.,
of Canada through its parent corporation, Husky Oil Ltd. of Canada,
(Fd. No. 2).

A reformer is a refining device used for making

gasoline, (Fd. No. 7 ) .
Gulf Oil Company, the seller, sells oil and gas at wholesale
and at retail in Canada (Fd. No. 3 ) . Gulf Oil Company does not
hold itself out as a seller of reformers but does sell its own
reformers when they become economically obsolescent (Fd. No. 4 ) .
The reformer in question became available for sale as a result of
Gulf's dismantling and moving the refinery to a new, modernized
location.
After purchasing the reformer, Husky Oil Company
caused it to be delivered and placed into operation at its Salt Lake
County refinery. No sales or use tax has been collected by any
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State as a result of the purchase (Fd. No. 10).

POINT I
UNDER THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTE, ONLY
PERSONS NOT RETAILERS OR NOT ENGAGED IN BUSINESS
QUALIFY FOR AN EXEMPTION FROM THE SALES AND USE
TAXES.
The use tax is imposed on "the storage, use or other
consumption in this State of tangible personal property purchased
for storage, use or other consumption in this State." Section 5916-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953).

Appellant does not dispute that

the property in question was purchased for use in this State, but
rather claims that the transaction is exempt from use tax.
It has been established that in deciding whether a
transaction cones within the scope of the use tax provisions or
is exempt therefrom, reference may be made to the sales tax
provisions. There is a liability for use tax if the transaction,
had it taken place in Utah, would have been subject to sales tax.
Further, there would be an exemption from use tax if, had it taken
place in Utah, there would have been an appropriate sales tax
exemption. The two statutes "are to be considered correlative and
complimentary, and so far as exemptions are concerned, legislative
created specific exemptions from the sales tax are also to be
treated as exemptions from the use tax." Geneva Steel CO. v. State
Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949) at 209 P.2d 208,
p. 210, reaffirming Union Portland Cement Company v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947).
The applicable sections of Utah Code Annotated (1953) are as follows:

-3-
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Section 59-15-4. From and after the effective
date of this act there is levied and there shall be
collected and paid:
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible
personal property made within the state of Utah
equivalent to four per cent of the purchase price
paid or charged, except that where a person takes,
as a trade-in for part payment of the merchandise
sold, tangible personal property other than money, •
that tax shall be computed and paid only upon the
net difference between the selling price of the
merchandise sold and the amount of the trade-in
allowance. The sale of coal, fuel oil and other
fuels shall not be subject to the tax except as
hereinafter provided.
Section 59-15-2. Definitions
(e) * * * The term "retail sale" means every
sale within the state of Utah by a retailer or
wholesaler to a user or consumer, except sales
defined as wholesale sales or otherwise exempted
by the terms of this act; but the term "retail
sale" is not intended to include isolated nor
occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged
in business, . . . .
This latter section of the Sales Tax Act states, very
simply, that a sale made by one who does not regularly engage in
business will not be taxed.

Thus, sales made by one who is in the

business of making retail sales is subject to the tax. No
distinction is made in the statute about the type of business the
taxpayer is in or the type of property he is selling. As counsel
for the Respondent urged at the hearing below, the exenption
should apply to situations such as a garage sale where a housewife disposes of an old refrigerator or sane other situation where
one who is not in business and does not regularly make retail
sales, makes a sale of personal property.
Husky argues that, to the contrary, the exenption for
isolated and occasional sales was intended to apply to retailers
and wholesalers who make a sale which is not part of the regular
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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course of their business. In support of this reading of the
statute they point to the definitions of retailer and wholesaler,
which provide that only those doing a "regularly organized"
wholesale or retail business are subject to the sales tax. Sections
59-15-2(c) and (e) , Utah Code Annotated (1953). Thus, the argument
goes, only retailers or wholesalers regularly organized can make
taxable retail sales in the first place, and, therefore, a housewife
Or other non-business seller does not need the exemption for isolated
or occasional sales because those transactions are not subject to
the sales tax. Therefore, Appellant concludes, the exemption has
no meaning and is surplusage if it applies only to non-business
sellers who are not taxed anyway.
This interpretation of the statute clearly flies in the
face of its plain language. The statute siirply says the same thing
two different ways, obviously for emphasis or clarity.
of the statutory provisions can be stated thus:

The logic

(1) Only retail

sales are taxed; (2) retail sales are those Hfca&e by a retailer or
wholesaler; (3) a retailer or wholesaler is a person doing a regularly organized retail or wholesale business; but, (4) an isolated
or occasional sale by a person not engaged in business is not
intended to be a retail sale.
These provisions are not inconsistent, and they are not
ambiguous.

Fundamentally, they present two obvious cases when a

sales tax liability would not arise:

(1) When the seller is not

a retailer or a wholesaler, and (2) when a seller not engaged in
business makes an isolated or occasional sale. Respondent believes
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that all cases relied upon by Appellant clearly fall into one or
the other of these two situations and that Appellant hiinself does
not qualify for either.
It is for certain that the Legislature did not say that
isolated and occasional sales of items which a retailer does not
regularly or often sell will be exempted from taxation.

If the

Legislature had so intended, it would have been a simple matter
to enact such an exemption.
Nevertheless, Appellant urges the Court to adopt such
an interpretation.

In response, Respondent would urge that as a

matter of statutory construction, it is universally held that an
exenption from taxation is to be construed very strictly and that
all doubts should be resolved in favor of taxation and against
exenption.

This Court has been guided by that principle since it

was announced in Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961 (1961),
wherein this Court states the following:
• * * * When, therefore, an owner claims that
certain property is exempt from taxation,
the burden is upon him to show that it falls
within the exception. And an exemption will
not be aided by judicial interpretation. It
must be shown to exist by express terms of
the enactment which, it is claimed grants it.
The presunption is that all exemptions
intended to be granted were granted in express
terms. In such cases the rule of strict
construction applies, and, in order to relieve
any species of property from its due and just
proportion of the burdens of the government,
the language relied on, as creating the
exenption, should be so clear as not to actaiit
of reasonable controversy about its meaning,
for all doubts must be resolved against the
exenption.

-6-
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It is not disputed that Gulf Oil of Canada is a regularly
organized wholesaler and retailer and regularly makes such sales .
therefore, under the plain meaning of the statute it would not
qualify for an isolated and occasional sale exemption from the
sales tax in Utah, even though it does not sell refineries as its
primary product. That exemption is therefore unavailable to Appellant, and the Commission's assessment of use tax was proper.

POINT II.
UTAH CASE LAW HAS NOT EXTENDED THE ISOLATED
AND OCCASIONAL SALES EXEMPTION TO A PURCHASE
SUCH AS WAS MADE BY HUSKY OIL.
Appellant cites Geneva Steel v. State Tax Commission,
116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949), to support its contention that
the exemption in question is designed to free retailers and wholesalers who are selling something other than their regular product
frcm a sales tax obligation.

In Geneva Steel, the War Assets Adminis-

tration sold their entire steel producing operations in Utah to
Geneva Steel Company.

The company maintained that they were exempt

from the use tax since the sale was within the isolated and occasional
sale exemption.
Although the Court observed that the sale of an entire
business is an isolated and occasional sale under the tax regulations
of most states, it did not hold that the exemption applies in Utah to
any sale of something other than the tangible personal property usually
sold by a retailer or wholesaler. The Tax Commission argued that, in
any event, the War Assets Administration had sold six other integrated

-7-
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businesses in Utah between the end of World Ifer II and the hearing
in 1949. The sale of an entire business seemed to be part of the
sellers regular course of business.
In response to the argument that the exemption was inapplicable for that reason.

The Court explained the basis for its con-

clusion that this sale was within the scope of the exemption.

1

Assuming, without deciding, that the War Assets
Administration makes retail sales as defined by our
sales tax act when it sells surplus items of
government property . . . , it is not making a
"retail sale11 when it sells an integrated business
to a new operator. The very nature and character
of the two types of sales is radically different.
The sale of a truck or a raft involves the simple
exchange of an article of tangible personal
property for a unit price. But the sale of an
integrated business for a lump sum price is a
complex transaction for it contemplates the
exchange of real property as well as personal
property, tangibles and intangibles, without
regard as to what amount is being paid for real
property, personal property, tangibles, or
intangibles. * * * We do not mean to imply
that a person can avoid paying the tax on the
sale of an article of personal property justly
due by combining it with the sale of real
property for a lump sum price. We only hold
the legislature did not intend to tax the sale
of personal property transferred as a component
part of the sale of an integrated business.
209 P.2d at 213 (Emphasis added.)
The Court pointed out in the above case that the sale

of an integrated business involves the transfer of real as well as
personal property, tangible as well as intangibles. It is not a
retail sale of tangible property as contenplated by the Sales Tax
Act.

For this reason the Court classifies it as an isolated and

occasional sale by a person not regularly engaged in business.

-8-
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In L, A. Young Sons Construction Company v. State Tax
Ctomission, 23 Utah 84, 457 P.2d 973 (1969) , the other major Utah
case upon which the Appellant relies, the Court held that the purchase of construction equipment in Wyoming by a Utah cotpany fell
within the isolated and occasional sale exemption applied to the
use tax. Of primary significance is the Court's observation that
the seller, a construction company, "has never been engaged in the
business of selling construction equipment nor in itaking retail sales,"
23 Utah at 85. Simply speaking, the seller was not a retailer and
the sale was thus not subject to the sales tax.
A company which is not in the business of making retail
sales is properly exempted from the sales tax when, on an isolated
occasion, it does make such a sale. L. A, Construction holds nothing
more.

It is thus distinguishable from the case at hand where the

seller, Gulf Oil, is a retailer, and for that reason the exaction
is unavailable to the Appellant.
It can only be concluded that except in the special situation
of the sale of an entire business to a single buyer, an occasional
sale can only be made by a non-retailer, or a person not engaged in
business. Appellant and the cases it relies upon are not in point.
POINT III
IT IS MISLEADING TO LOOK TO THE LAW OF OTHER
JURISDICTIONS FOR THE MEANING OF THE UTAH
ISOLATED AND OCCASIONAL SALES EXEMPTION.
The Appellant has quite properly submitted that "the
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court control this case and there

-9-
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is no need to look to the law of other state jurisdictions."
(Brief of Appellant, p. 14) Nevertheless, several cases from other
jurisdictions are cited to aid the Court in construing the Utah
law. A rev iew of the law of other states reveals a variety of
statutory provisions and judicial constructions of isolated or
occasional sales tax exemptions having little relation to each
other.
The Appellant's citation of Big Three Industries Inc.
v. Keystone Industries, Inc., 472 S.W. 2d 850 (Tex. Civil Appeals
1971), illustrates the misunderstanding which easily arises when
judicial interpretations of one state's law are offered to establish
the meaning of another state's statute. The Texas Court of Civil
Appeals held that their occasional salesexemption was designed to
apply to sales by retailers of items not regularly sold in the course
of business. The Texas Court noted that if the exemption were construed to apply to non-retailers, it would be surplusage as the tax
by definition applies to retailers alone. The Appellant has made a
similar argument about the Utah statute.
There are, however, crucial differences between the
Texas statute and the Utah statute, which make a superficial

•'•/Cases from many jurisdictions on isolated or occasional
sales exemptions are compiled in an annotation at
42 A.L.R. 3d 292. The author concludes that "the
exemption of isolated or occasional sales depends
primarily upon the statutory language and the judicial
construction of specific terms," and that "statutory
language and judicial interpretation are not uniform."
42 A.L.R. 3d at 295-296.
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comparison of the two misleading.

The Utah statute provides for

an isolated and occasional sale exemption in the section which
defines "retailer11 and "retail sale." As noted earlier, the
intended construction of that section is singularly important to
its understanding.

The Texas statute includes an isolated and

occasional sale exemption in a separate section with very different
wording. Exempted sales are limited to:
"one (1) or two (2) sales of tangible personal
property at retail during any twelve month
period by a person who does not hold himself
out as engaging (or who does not habitually
engage) in the business of selling such
personal property."
Article 20.01(F), Title 122 A revised, Civil
Statutes of Texas. (Emphasis added.)
The Texas Court stated quite explicitly that the phrase
w

such personal property," absent from our statute, indicated that

the exemption applies when a retailer sells scraething other than the
product he holds himself out as selling or habitually sells. Their
decision and their rationale for reading Texas law as they did are
inapposite to the interpretation of the Utah Sales Tax Act*
The purpose and scope of the isolated and occasional sales
exemption are matters of Utah law.

It is unhelpful and misleading

to look to the tax law of other jurisdictions for the meaning of our
own statutes.
POINT IV.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION REXSULATIOSf S-38 IS
A VALID INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTORY
ISOLATED AND OCCASIONAL SALES EXEMPTION AND
WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO HUSKY OIL.
The State Tax Commission has been delegated authority

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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by the Legislature "to prescribe, adopt and enforce regulations"
relating to the administration of "the Sales Tax Act and the Use
Tax Act." Sections 59-15-20, 59-16-21, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
Rule S-38(d) was promulgated to regulate the isolated and occasional
sale exemptions. This rule is consistent with the plain meaning of
the statute and Utah case law on the subject.
Rule S-38:
* * *

" (d) Isolated or 'occasional sales made by
persons not regularly engaged in business are
not subject to the tax. The word 'business'
refers to an enterprise engaged in selling
tangible personal property or taxable services
notwithstanding the fact that the sales may be
few or infrequent. No sale of tangible personal
property made by a person licensed to collect
sales tax is considered to be isolated or occasional
even though the tangible personal property was used
by the seller in his regular business prior to the
sale. However, any sale of an entire business is
not deemed to be a taxable sale and no tax will
apply to the sale of any assets made part of such
a sale (with the exception of vehicles subject to
registration) provided that the entire business
is sold to a single buyer."
•

i

•' .'•

Rule S-38(d) provides that only sales of tangible personal
property made by a person not licensed to collect sales taxes will be
exempted.

Of course, all those who are engaging in a regularly organ-

ized retail business will be licensed to collect the tax.

This rule

is entirely consistent with the plain meaning of the statute, that
only those not regularly engaged in business are exempted from the
sales tax.
By expressly providing that the sale of an entire business
to a single buyer is per se isolated and occasional, the Tax Commission
has recognized the unique nature of such a sale, as did this Court in
Geneva Steel.
-12-
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This rule, like any regulation promulgated by a state
agency with authority to enforce the lav; is entitled to a presumption of correctness.

In McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d

238, 381 P.2d 726 (1963), the petitioner appealed the decision of
the State Land Board denying his application for oil and gas leases*
Their denial was based upon a regulation which he maintained was in
conflict with the applicable statute.
The Court began its examination of the regulations
stating:
"First let us consider whether the rules
and regulations of the State Land Board were
so repugnant to the statute as to be contradictory and irreconcilable therewith."
381 P.2d at 730.
Later they observed that, whenever possible, administrative regulations should be construed to harmonize with the statutes they interpret and enforce.
An administrative regulation does not lose its presurrption
of correctness siirtply because it is more restrictive than an earlier
regulation of the same siibject natter. Prior to the prcmulgation of
Rule S-38, the State Tax Commission had applied the isolated and
occasional sale exemption to any sale not made in the regular course
of a retailerfs or wholesaler's business.
It was noted in Reaveley v. Public Service Commission, 20
Utah 2d 137, 436 P.2d 797, 800 (1968), that administrative agencies
are not bound by rules of stare decisis applied to courts and are
free to depart from prior determinations of policy.

That the State

Tax Conmission reconsidered its view of the scope of the exemption

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
-13-OCR, may contain errors.

in question does not alter its validity.

This Court, of course,

and not the agency, has the final duty to say what the law is
regardless of the duration or the alteration of an interpretative
administrative ruling.
Rule S-38 is a reasonable application of the isolated and
occasional sales exemption in the Sales Tax Act and is consistent
with judicial construction of the exeitption. Its enforcement
against Husky Oil by the State Tax Commission should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
Under the plain

meaning of the statute, only those not

retailers or not regularly engaged in business are eligible for the
isolated and occasional sales exemption from the sales and use taxes.
Because Husky Oil purchased its reformer from a seller who regularly
engages in retail and wholesale transactions, that purchase is not
exempted from the use tax.

The State Tax Commission's assessment of

a $30,375.00 use tax deficiency, together with interest thereon as
provided by law, was proper and should be upheld by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. RQMSEY
Attorney General
G. Blaine Davis
Assistant Attorney General
STEPHEN R. RANDLE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
Dated this 30th day of June, 1976.
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